Abstract The importance of prices, doctor and patient characteristics, and market institutions for the likelihood of choosing generic drugs instead of the more expensive original brand-name version are examined. Using an extensive dataset extracted from The Norwegian Prescription Database containing all prescriptions dispensed to individuals in February 2004 and 2006 on 23 different drugs (chemical substances) in Norway, we find strong evidence for the importance of both doctor and patient characteristics for the choice probabilities. The price difference between brand and generic versions and insurance coverage both affect generic substitution. Moreover, controlling for the retail chain affiliation of the dispensing pharmacy, we find that pharmacies play an important role in promoting generic substitution. In markets with more recent entry of generic drugs, brand-name loyalty proves to be much stronger, giving less explanatory power to our demand model.
Introduction
When a pharmaceutical patent expires, firms may enter the market with a generic version of the original brand-name drug. As these drugs contain exactly the same active chemical substances, they are certified by drug authorities to be substitutable with the original branded drugs. The only requirement for approval to enter the market is that the generic producers are able to prove that its drug contains the same active substance. Other characteristics, such as inert ingredients, shape, colour and name, may differ as well as marketing effort by producers. Although brandname and generic contain the same chemical substance and for that reason are substitutes, there is still some degree of product differentiation (see, e.g. [18] ).
Due to increasing expenditure on medicines, generic substitution has been introduced in several countries. Although generic substitution plays an important role in cutting drug costs after patent expiration, it is well known that entry of generic drugs appears to be gradual in many countries [2] . Moreover, brand-name producers are often able to maintain a high-price strategy instead of engaging in fierce price competition with generic producers. Both theoretical and empirical research have shown that the brand-name producer may choose to meet generic competition by raising prices, targeting the market segment that remains loyal to the earlier patented drug-a sort of ''generic competition paradox'' (see [4, 8, 11, 17] ).
The patented drug benefits from a period of exclusiveness in treating patients with a particular chemical substance. During this period, doctors receive brand-name specific information from the pharmaceutical company, and they gradually learn the drug's effectiveness in treating different types of patients. This may establish a brandname loyalty that persists into the post-patent period. Brand-name loyalty is expected to be of particular importance in this market since physicians have no economic incentive to let drug prices affect their choices, or to keep themselves informed about new generics entering the market. Physicians have incentives to serve the interests of their patients, but the insurance schemes in many countries make the patient ignorant of drug prices.
Patients themselves may have preferences for using a brand-name drug since this is the drug they are used to taking. For some patient groups, it may be hard to accept that a drug with a different name, colour and shape can have exactly the same therapeutic qualities. As the patient's agent, this may be another source of brand-name loyalty by doctors. Since patients, at least in Norway, are insulated from the extra cost of using the brand-name drug, even a small positive effect (other than price) for the patient using the brand-name may lead the doctor to prefer to prescribe brand-name drugs.
Using a panel data set for a subsample of the population in Rome for the years 1990-1992, Coscelli [5] was able to reveal the habit behaviour claimed by Hellerstein [12] . His results support habit persistence among doctors but, differently from Hellerstein, the results prove that patient characteristics also affect prescription choice. As noted by Lundin [13] , an important draw-back with these two studies is the lack of price data. The scope for habit persistence is expected to be affected by price differences. Using data from two pharmacies in a small Swedish municipality, Lundin [13] investigates the importance of price differences in drug choice. He finds support for habit persistence among doctors and patients, but the results indicate that these are affected by price differencesespecially the share of price differences covered by the patient. If the price differences between generic and brandname increases, doctors become more inclined to prescribe a generic version.
Having access to a newly established database that contains data on all drugs dispensed to individuals in Norway, the current paper investigates how prices, different regulatory schemes (like in [1, 15] ), characteristics of patients, doctors and pharmacies affect substitution between brand-name and generics. The choices of patients/ doctors and pharmacies are modelled as a bilateral comparison between the utilities of using brand-name and generics. The utility is random, with the random parts being extreme value distributed, which implies that the choice probabilities are conditional logit probabilities. In this dataset, we are unable to disentangle the doctors' prescriptions and the choices made by the pharmacies, given that the doctor has not blocked a generic substitute.
The choice probabilities in our model are thus the product of the prescription probability and the choice probability of the pharmacies. In the empirical model, we allow for unobserved heterogeneity in the choice probabilities, which is assumed to be distributed across chemical substances. To some extent therefore, we are accounting for substitution beyond generic substitution. Using detailed data from a huge, and newly established, Norwegian database, this study makes a novel and valuable contribution to the understanding of generic substitution.
Our main findings are:
1. the larger the difference in price, the less likely it is that the brand-name is purchased; 2. patients covered by the national insurance scheme are more likely to use the brand-name drug. 3. older patients are less likely to end up with a generic; 4. younger doctors are more likely to prescribe a generic; 5. time after generic entry matters, the probability of generic prescription increases with time after generic entry-generic substitution is less likely for newly off-patent molecules; 6. variation in generic substitution practices across pharmacy chains.
Thus, like in Lundin [13] , we find that the price differences between brand-name and generic versions affect generic substitution. In previous studies of generic substitution, however, there has been no attempt to control for the market age of generic versions. Some drugs have had generic versions available for many years, while others have been more recently opened up for generic entry. Studies of brand-name loyalty based on aggregate market data reports that the market share of brand-name drugs falls steadily after generic entry (see [4, 11, 8, 16] ). Our findings are in line with these studies as we find that the price response is much lower for drugs that have recently lost patent protection.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. ''The pharmaceutical market in Norway'' reports relevant aspects of the Norwegian pharmaceutical market. ''Data'' contains a description of the dataset. ''The econometric model'' presents the econometric model. ''Empirical results'' shows the estimation results, and ''Price response of generic substitution'' concludes.
The pharmaceutical market in Norway
Regulation of prescription drugs concerns both producers' entry and pricing decisions, and pharmacy retail margins. The regulatory authority related to the pharmaceutical sector in Norway is the Norwegian Ministry of Health and Social Affairs. The Ministry, and its agency (Norwegian Medicines Agency), control the entry of new drugs, wholesale prices, and retail margins. The manufacturer price is unregulated. The Norwegian Health System offers statutory public health insurance, and close to 70% of total drug expenses are covered by this insurance scheme. These expenses have been increasing rather rapidly due to an ageing population, and the entry of new and more expensive drugs. For drugs approved for reimbursement by the social insurance scheme, the share of total cost paid by patients in Norway amounts to 11%. This is much lower than in other Nordic countries. In Denmark, this share amounts to 42%, while in Sweden patients cover 26%. In the UK, Spain, and France, patients pay only 6-7% of total costs [14] .
In recent decades the Norwegian government has introduced several policy initiatives to foster competition after patent expiry. From 1987, doctors were encouraged to prescribe the cheapest available version of a drug. In 1991, this light-handed regulation was replaced by a law that instructed doctors to prescribe the cheapest available generic drug. Doctors could still prescribe a more expensive brand-name version, as long as a medical reason could be provided.
In this period, generic competition was based entirely on the prescription choice of the doctor. The pharmacy was required to dispense the exact product name written on the prescription. This changed in March 2001 when pharmacies were allowed to substitute a branded drug for a generic, independent of the product name prescribed by the doctor. Being permitted to intervene between the physician and the patient, the pharmacies now played an active role in the market for generics. The doctor can still guard against substitution, but this requires an explicit reservation to be added to the prescription note (''active substitution method''). 1 If the doctor refuses to substitute a generic on behalf of a patient who is covered by the social insurance scheme, the brand-name price mark-up (as compared with the cheapest generic version) is paid by the social insurance scheme. In Norway, physicians objected to substitution in 5.2% of prescriptions in 2005, and in 4.5% in 2006. Even without such a reservation by the physician, the patient may insist on the branded drug, in which case the pharmacy is obliged to dispense the brand-name drug. In this case, the insurance scheme does not cover the price difference between the branded drug and the reference price; the difference has to be paid by the patient himself. In 2005, patients refused to substitute in 4.0% of prescriptions (4.3% in 2006) . This is in addition to reservations by physicians, bringing the total number refusals to substitute close to an average of 10% of all prescriptions.
In addition to generic substitution, several price-regulation schemes have been adopted (see [3, 7, 6] ). In 2004, from which our first dataset is extracted, two schemes were in use: a ''price cap scheme'' and a reference price scheme termed ''index pricing''. Under the price cap scheme alone, the regulator sets a maximum price level defined by the lowest observed prices in a selection of European countries. This price cap is first set when the brand-name drug enters the market. After patent expiration, generic drugs are given the exact same price cap, and this cap will fall only if generic competition triggers price reductions in the reference countries. However, competition from generics (made possible by generic substitution) was thought to lower prices below the price cap. After price comparisons with other Nordic countries, the Ministry of Health concluded that generic competition was not sufficiently successful in bringing down prices under the cap price scheme.
This weak price response of generic competition was the motivation behind the scheme ''index pricing'' introduced in March 2003. The index price scheme was established with six different drugs: omeprazol (ulcer), enalapril and lisinopril (high blood pressure and heart failure), citalopram (depression), cetirizin and loratadin (allergy). Simvastatin (high cholesterol) was added in June 2004. For these drugs, the regulator set a reimbursement price (the index price) to be paid to the dispensing pharmacy, irrespective of what the chain paid for the chosen drug. This gives the pharmacies strong incentives to facilitate fierce price competition between producers of generic drugs. The index price on a drug (chemical substance) was updated every 3 months, and was made equal to the sales-weighted average of all prices reported by the pharmacy chains, plus a fixed distribution (wholesale and retail) margin. If a retailer selected a producer with a price exceeding the average of the sales-weighted average of all prices, the net margin of the integrated retailer-wholesale pharmacy firm drops below the fixed distribution margin, whereas a retailer selecting a producer with a lower producer price experiences an increase in his net margin. This regular update of the index price, based on observed producer prices from previous months, ensured that the index price tracked developments in producer prices over time. The index price scheme was expected to stimulate generic substitution in pharmacies, thereby triggering price competition between producers. Brekke et al. [3] investigated to what extent the index price scheme was successful in stimulating price competition compared to price cap regulation. They found that index price regulation significantly reduced both brand-name (by 18-19%) and generic prices (7-8%).
In January 2005, the index price scheme was replaced with a new price regulation scheme that abandoned the direct use of economic incentives to bring down pharmaceutical prices after patent expiration. The new schemethe so-called stepped price model-consists of a predefined, stepwise reduction of the reimbursed price, starting from the time of generic entry into the market. Pharmacies are instructed to have the drug available at the reimbursable retail price.
The regulated reimbursable price is based on the maximum retail price of the patented drug before generics enter. Let AUP* be the price before the patent expires. The stepped price model determines the reimbursable price according to the rule described in Fig. 1 .
For drugs with annual sales above 100 million NOK prior to generic entry, the second price reduction was set equal to 40% (instead of 50%), and the third was set equal to 50% (instead of 70%). Lately, these cuts have been increased even more.
The scheme gives pharmacy chains strong incentives to lower their purchasing prices. The model does not prescribe any future price reviews based on the development of these prices. All cost savings-in terms of reduced purchasing prices-are kept by the pharmacies themselves. This scheme illustrates the fundamental trade-off that often has to be made in price regulation. Maximum incentives to minimise costs (here, to put pressure on producer prices for generic drugs) are obtained by offering fixed retail prices. However, in order to be credible, these prices must be set at sufficiently conservative levels. If the government is too eager to reduce the cost of drug reimbursement-by setting post-generic prices at very low levels-the pharmacies will report economic problems, which in turn will make it necessary for the government to increase prices. If such a scheme could be enforced without protests from the pharmacy chains, there are good reasons to expect that predetermined price would be pleasantly higher than the purchasing prices. 2 Generic drugs are relatively cheap to produce, and pre-generic prices reflect the cost of undertaking research and development investments to innovate the drug in the first place. For many drugs, a price drop of 50 or 70% may still keep prices above the cost of producing generic drugs.
Data
Our data was extracted from the Norwegian Prescription Database (NorPD) at the Norwegian Institute of Public Health. NorPD was established on 1 January 2004, see Furu [9] . All drugs in Norway are classified according to the Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) classification system. The following information is recorded for each individual prescription: patient's unique identifying number (encrypted), gender, age, place of residence, date of death, the dispensing pharmacy, information about the prescriber (sex, age, speciality), detailed information about the dispensed medication including the dispensing date, ATC code, price, package size, strength and reimbursement code. Using other sources of information provided by the Norwegian Medicines Control Authority (list of pharmacies and a list of drugs approved for the Norwegian market), we obtained additional information about pharmacy ownership and producer name of the drugs. The latter is used to identify brand-name drugs and generics. For more details, refer to Furu [9, 10] . With up to 23 chemical substances, we were able to cover a broad set of indications, such as blood pressure and heart failure, cholesterol, depression, ulcer, antibiotics, and allergy. Several of the drugs in the study are among the best-selling drugs in Norway, which was also the motivation for selecting these drugs. The drugs include simvastatin (cholesterol), cetirizin (allergy), and enalapril (blood pressure [14] ).
The variables that we employ in the econometric model are listed and described briefly in Table 2 . The dependent variable, or the unity of observation, is the purchase of a pharmaceutical for which both the original product (brand) and generics with the same chemical substance are available. Thus the dependent variable, called brand-name in Table 2 , is a dummy, which equals 1 if the brand-name is chosen and 0 otherwise, i.e. when a generic is chosen. If a brand-name is chosen, then the retail price of the chosen brand-name represents the price of the brand-name. Because we model the choice of brand versus generics we need to represent the price of the generics not chosen in the model. The price of the generics is calculated as the monthly average of the prices of the generics with the same chemical substance and strength as the brand-name sold by the same pharmacy chain that sells the branded product.
The summary statistics for the 2 months in 2004 and 2006 are given in Table 3 . The prices are in NOK per DDD, and represent pharmacy retail prices.
On average, every second prescription ends up with a brand-name being dispensed by a pharmacy. In 2006 this ratio had increased slightly and, as shown below, this was due to the entry of new generic markets. In 2006, 66% of the patients were aged 60 years or older, and 63% of the doctors were aged 40-60.
The market shares of the pharmacy chains are stable, with a market share of 33% in 2006 for the largest one. Note that five different pharmacy categories are identified in the data. There are three pharmacy chains: Apotek 1 (owned by the Finnish company Tamro), Vitus (owned by the German company Celesio), and Alliance (owned by Alliance Boots). In addition, there are the hospital pharmacies and a few small independent retail pharmacies. These are treated as two separate groups-adding up to the five chain dummies in the data. 
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In 2006, 86% of the dispensed prescriptions were covered by the national insurance scheme.
The econometric model
The problem we analysed was the patient's/doctor's choice of a drug when both the original (brand-named) and previously patented product and a generic are available on the market. To model this choice of generic substitution we applied a random utility model. As an outside observer, we did not observe all variables that affect this choice and hence a random element had to be included in the utility function.
Let U Bjn be the utility for patient/doctor n of choosing the brand-name version of the chemical substance j and let U Gjn be the utility of choosing a generic version of the same substance. Let X kjn be a vector of individual and/or substance specific explanatory variables, k = B (brand), G (generic), and let b be the corresponding vector of unknown coefficients. Furthermore, let e kjn , k = B, G, be random taste-shifter, independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) extreme value distributed with zero expectation and variance r 2 . The latter variance is also called the scale coefficient. We note that the random taste-shifter depends on the alternatives. Then,
where a j is chemical substance specific constant. We observe that e kjn r ¼ e kjn is an extreme value distributed with zero expectation and unit variance. Thus,
where
Let u kjn denote the probability that agent n chooses alternative {k, j}. By assuming utility maximisation we obtain
where a j ¼ a Bj À a Gj and
We will assume that a j are random coefficients, distributed normally across the chemical substances, with expectation" a; variance l 2 and correlation coefficient q. When estimating the model, the random part has to be integrated out of the probabilities. Note that when the coefficients a j are random, the IIA assumption is avoided. The probability model is a conditional logit model; with random coefficients it is called ''mixed logit'' [19] . In the empirical model, the age of the patient as well as the age of the doctor is continuous. These two variables and also the doctors' speciality as well as the gender of the patient/doctor are included to capture some habit-persistence effects. Our hypothesis is that the older the patient and/or the doctor, the more likely it is that a brand-name is chosen. Moreover, we expect that when the patient and the doctor are of the same gender they can more easily communicate and hence might tend to keep using the brand-name.
Empirical results
The unknown coefficients " a; b; l; q f g are estimated in a mixed logit maximum likelihood procedure (see Train [19] ). The estimates, including the marginal effects and the 95% confidence interval of marginal effects, are reported in Tables 4 and 5 .
Price response of generic substitution
The estimates imply that the probability of choosing a brand-name drug decreases with the price differential between the brand and generics. The price impact is estimated sharply and implies that generic substitution may occur due to price differentials. However, the marginal impacts are not strong compared to the impact of other variables. This is particularly the case in 2006.
The price elasticity related to the probability u Bjn is given by the following formula:
Here, q j denotes the price differential P Bj -P Gj , and b P the coefficient attached to the price in the probabilities. In order to get an overall price elasticity, one has to take the weighted average across the ATC codes (j indicates the ATC code, i.e. the chemical substances) and across individuals. In addition, one has to integrate out the random elements related to the coefficients a j .
Doing this, we obtain the following weighted elasticities: 
Importance of doctor and patient characteristics
In 2004, the probability of choosing brand was significantly higher when the patient and the doctor were of the same sex. In 2006 the tendency was the same, but the impact was weaker. In both years the probability of choosing brand increased with the age of the patient. Thus, brand loyalty increases with the age of the patient. In the same vein, the probability of choosing brand increased with the age of the doctor. The impact is significant in both years, and indicates that younger doctors are more willing to prescribe generics than their older colleagues. Approximately 85% of the prescriptions are written by general practitioners (GPs), both in 2004 and 2006. These doctors are estimated to be more likely to end up with patients choosing brand-name drugs. Thus hospital doctors seem to be more inclined to prescribe generics.
The estimates of the impact of ''blue'' on the probability of choosing brand-name are positive and the marginal impact is strong. This is what one would expect. ''Blue'' means that the government is reimbursing a large part of the expenses, and the doctor/patient thus has a weaker incentive to switch to cheaper generic versions. Note that if the doctor explicitly claims in the prescription that the brand-name must be used, the patient does not have to pay for the price-difference between the brandname and a generic version. This difference is covered entirely by the insurance scheme. This result is consistent with the moral hazard problem arising between the insurer and the doctors.
Market and institutional characteristics
According to the rule of generic substitution in Norway, the pharmacy should dispense the cheapest generic to the patient, unless the doctor or patient has stated explicitly that this should not be done. Patients who are indifferent to brand-name or generic will accept the version provided by the pharmacy. Others may object and, even after receiving information and advice, still stick to a brand-name version, but at extra cost to the patient reflecting the price difference. There are also cases in which, after more careful information from the pharmacist, the patient accepts the substitute.
The incentives to expend effort convincing a patient to accept substitution are affected by producer prices. If the pharmacy margin is largest on a generic drug, these incentives are strictly positive, but are absent if the margin is larger on brand-name drugs. Of the five pharmacy chains in Norway (including the group of independent pharmacies), chain no. 2 stands out from the others with an estimate that implies that this chain is more inclined to give the patient the original and previously patented product. This effect is very strong. Looking at the marginal impact, we observe that, in 2004, a patient receiving the drug from chain no. 2 is 15% more likely to end up with a brand-name drug compared to patients receiving the drug from chain no. 3. In 2006, this difference had increased to 32%. This shows the importance of pharmacy discretion in generic substitution.
Our hypothesis is that these differences between chains, in contributing to substitution, reflect the outcome of bargaining with producers. A chain that ends up with a high price margin on brand-name drugs will be less motivated to convince the patient to switch to a generic version. We stress, however, that our data does not allow us to test this hypothesis. This would require data on producer prices, not just the retail prices that were available for our study.
Of particular interest is the result of the impact of the index price regime on the choice of brand versus generics. As mentioned above, in 2004 this regime should have given the pharmacy an incentive to dispense cheaper versions. In our dataset, four chemical substances were covered by this regime in 2004 (the reg_scheme dummy). For these substances, the probability of choosing brand turns out to be lower than for other substances. The impact is strong, with 26% lower probability of choosing brandname versions. This result is in line with results derived by Brekke [3] . They find that the index-price scheme had a significant and strong impact on prices, both of generic and brand-name versions. Note that, although prices dropped, and more so for brand-names, the price of a brand-name was still higher than that of generics.
The size of the market for a given chemical substance, here measured by n-ddd, has a positive impact on the probability of choosing a brand-name product.
New generic markets
In the 2006 results, the dummy-variable ''New_generics'' identifies chemical substances that experienced generic entry after 2004. It takes time to adjust to new products, and brand-name loyalty may contribute to slowing down the process of having an original product replaced by cheaper generics. Therefore, we expect generic substitution to behave differently in newer generic markets. This is confirmed in our estimates for 2006. The marginal impact of the ''new generics'' dummy is sizeable, positive on the demand for brand, and highly significant.
We also see that the price response of substitution is much lower in 2006. As reported above, the price elasticity changes from - Tables 6 and 7 below.
There are significant differences in generic substitution in new and older markets. The estimated probability of choosing the brand-name drug in a new generic market is 0.63. In older generic markets this amounts to 0.45.
The low price response indicated by the estimation on merged data is confirmed here. The marginal impact on the probability of choosing the brand is -0.059 for drugs with earlier generic entry, but drops to -0.003 for new generic markets. The estimates are still highly significant.
According to the estimates, patient age has still a positive and significant impact on generic substitution in new generic markets as well as in older markets. However, the marginal impact is much stronger in older markets. Doctor's age has a significant effect on the substitution pattern. In older generic markets, older doctors are more loyal to the brand-name than their younger colleagues. This changes when we look into newer generic markets. Now, older doctors are more inclined to prescribe generics. Although the impacts are significant, the marginal effects are small.
Insurance status still has a strong effect on substitution decisions. The probability that patients covered by the social insurance scheme choose the brand-name in new markets is 14% higher than patients without coverage. In older generic markets, this difference amounts to as much as 47%. Interestingly, the effect of pharmacy chain is still strong and significant. Again, pharmacy chain 2 has a strong positive effect on the probability of choosing the brandname. The estimated magnitude of this effect is the same in older and new generic markets.
Conclusions
A binomial mixed logit model with random effects was employed to estimate the probabilities of choosing brandname versus generics on a unique dataset containing the entire population of prescriptions in Norway in February 2004 and 2006. Two different regulatory schemes were present in these periods. We observed various characteristics of the patient and doctor, together with price and other attributes of the drug and pharmacies. We find that price matters in the choice of drugs, and that generic substitution driven by price difference is significantly weaker in markets where generics have recently been introduced. Patient and doctor characteristics have an impact on the choice of branded products versus generics. The younger the doctor and/or the patient, the more likely it is that a generic will be chosen. Pharmacy ownership also matters for the degree of generic substitution. One of the pharmacy chains operating in Norway is far more inclined to give the patient the brand-name product than the generic. Future research should investigate the sources of this difference between pharmacies in promoting substitution.
Finally, we find that the regulatory scheme that was in use in 2004, but not that in 2006, had a positive impact on the use of generics.
The Norwegian prescription data allows the repeated decisions of both the patient and doctor to be studies. In further research we hope to develop a dynamic model, exploiting the panel structure of the data. Following the entire population of patients and prescribing doctors in Norway over several years offers a unique possibility of accounting for heterogeneity among decision makers in the drug market.
